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Re: [Shibboleth-Announce] Shibboleth 2.0 SP Release Candidate 1


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  • From: Ian Young <>
  • To:
  • Subject: Re: [Shibboleth-Announce] Shibboleth 2.0 SP Release Candidate 1
  • Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2008 17:19:45 +0000
  • Openpgp: id=EA2882BB

Scott Cantor wrote:

Can I ask what value you expect that requirement to bring? We tried to
think this through for the UK, and we couldn't see that anything bad
(other than non-functionality) would happen if someone handed us the
wrong public key... certainly no security issues that we could think of.

I'm not sure I follow. If the key's wrong, then the attacker who substituted
his own public key can decrypt anything sent to that SP and will be able to
authenticate as that SP. (Presumably attacking the key is accompanied by
other protocol attacks, otherwise you're not likely to get much.)

Sorry, I missed out my assumption that you'd be authenticating the *source* of the public key. Obviously if you don't do that you're in trouble. The question is whether if you *are* authenticating the source of the public key, adding PoP on top gives you anything you need (in the context of people handing a federation operator a public key to be embedded in metadata).

-- Ian



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