Skip to Content.
Sympa Menu

netsec-sig - [Security-WG] Re: [NTAC] New Well-Known BGP Community for Blackholing

Subject: Internet2 Network Security SIG

List archive

[Security-WG] Re: [NTAC] New Well-Known BGP Community for Blackholing


Chronological Thread 
  • From: David Farmer <>
  • To: "" <>
  • Cc: "Spears, Christopher M." <>, Grover Browning <>, "" <>, "" <>, "" <>
  • Subject: [Security-WG] Re: [NTAC] New Well-Known BGP Community for Blackholing
  • Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 10:29:57 -0500

Bill, 

This is discussed in the Security Considerations Section of the draft, basically RPKI or BGPSec don't protect the communities from modification. So, it helps but doesn't really solve that problem.

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 9:31 AM, Bill Jensen <> wrote:
Would implementing RPKI help with this or would its value, in the case of blackholing, be limited to only whom you peer with?

-wej

On 7/26/16 9:19 AM, Spears, Christopher M. wrote:
On Jul 26, 2016, at 9:44 AM, Grover Browning <> wrote:

David,

Do you see a downside to transiting?

(Answering for myself, not David :)

IMHO, it’s an issue of trust/verification.  At a fixed point in time, you may trust a certain peer network; however you cannot control who they peer with, or what they accept from those peers, or their peers, etc.   That said, the route will be propagated, so you can always limit the origin-as you’ll accept this from.  Of course, you’re then back to a per-peer blackhole policy, just using a well-known BGP community.

For BLACKHOLE, everything I can think of begins with: "First, hijack the route …”
Blackholing is the ultimate DOS - you get your target /32s blackholed, and you’ve won.  Again, trust.  This is all destination-based hinting, not source-specific ingress filtering for DDOS, and has nothing to do with route hijacking.  BCP38, anti-virus/malware, anti-botnet efforts, and bleach are the only solutions for DDOS at the moment.  Route hijacking has a mixed bag of arguably effective tools, as well.

-Chris


-Grover


On Jul 25, 2016, at 7:55 PM, David Farmer <> wrote:

if experiments show it's useful I'd support it, but right now I'm skeptical how useful transiting this would be for us.


--
Bill Jensen, Network Engineer
UW-Madison DoIT Network Services
Rm B116 CSSC, 1210 W. Dayton St., Madison, WI  53706
voice: 608-263-9325  efax: 413-208-1297
email:    cell: 608-576-8345
sms:




--
===============================================
David Farmer              
Networking & Telecommunication Services
Office of Information Technology
University of Minnesota  
2218 University Ave SE        Phone: 612-626-0815
Minneapolis, MN 55414-3029   Cell: 612-812-9952
===============================================



Archive powered by MHonArc 2.6.19.

Top of Page