shibboleth-dev - Re: authentication strength

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Re: authentication strength

From: Tom Scavo <>
To:
Subject: Re: authentication strength
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 09:10:14 -0500
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On 2/15/06, Scott Cantor
<>
wrote:
>
> The Feds use an attribute, FWIW.

Yes, thanks. Both Francisco Pinto and Nate Klingenstein suggested
this as well. Nate pointed me to the following document:

http://www.cio.gov/eauthentication/documents/SAMLspec.pdf

This is a useful starting point.

> Strong PKI + anybody gets a cert with no proof = low LOA

Key point, of course.

Thanks,
Tom

authentication strength, Tom Scavo, 02/15/2006
- RE: authentication strength, Ramanathan, Subbu, 02/15/2006
- Re: authentication strength, Walter Hoehn, 02/15/2006
  - Re: authentication strength, Tom Scavo, 02/15/2006
    - RE: authentication strength, Scott Cantor, 02/15/2006
      - Re: authentication strength, Ian Young, 02/16/2006
        
        Re: authentication strength, Tom Scavo, 02/16/2006
      - Re: authentication strength, Tom Scavo, 02/16/2006
      - Re: authentication strength, Von Welch, 02/16/2006
        
        Re: authentication strength, Keith Hazelton, 02/16/2006
        
        Re: authentication strength, Tom Scavo, 02/19/2006
        
        Re: authentication strength, Keith Hazelton, 02/19/2006

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Re: authentication strength