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  • From: Nate Klingenstein <>
  • To:
  • Subject: Deploy Guides
  • Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2002 20:10:02 +0000

All revisions to date, including vi support, patched in. Still to do is breaking out logging in the target guide; figure this will be done by the end of the week, I hope. Send all other new changes to me as well.

I don't have CVS access. Please update all copies, including website, etc. to match these; version numbers incremented to reflect this.

Nate.

http://darkavatar.pseudonymous.net/deploy_origin_19.html
http://darkavatar.pseudonymous.net/deploy_target_20.html


Title: Shibboleth Target Deployment Guide

Shibboleth Target Deployment Guide

Shibboleth Target Deployment Guide
draft-internet2-mace-shibboleth-shib-target-deploy-20.html
Nate Klingenstein
26 November, 2002
Comments should be directed to .

Shibboleth v0.7 has some limitations and lacks certain security provisions which will be present in the final version. It is strongly advised that this version not be used to protect any sensitive data. Some sections of the deploy guide have not yet been populated with text. This document describes additional functionality which will be present in the final version, but which is not implemented in the v0.7, including but not limited to:

  • Some security features, including authentication of SHARs, and support for non-trivial certificate validation processes beyond simple CA validation.

  • Bundling of SSO or WebISO systems.

  • Any support for customized target side AAP's, except by writing an Apache module to implement the desired policy. As shipped, EPPN and eduPersonAffiliation are only accepted from the AA if the scope value is equal to the value of "domain" in the origin site HS's web.xml file, which will be the same as the name provided in registration with Club Shib.

  • Club Shib is only a rudimentary concept at this time, and no support for multiple clubs or club policies is provided. Registration with the Shibboleth project management team is required to interoperate with other test sites, unless peer to peer sharing of certificate information is undertaken. For more information about acquiring certificates accepted by Club Shib, please refer to section 2.d.

Functionality which has been added since the previous version (alpha-2.5) includes:

  • A completely new target side implementation. New features include separation of the SHAR and SHIRE, elimination of the need for Tomcat unless running a WAYF as well, and dynamic generation of error pages. Configuration and functionality are similar to what was found in alpha-2.5.
  • A new C/C++ based implementation of OpenSAML.
  • Shibboleth and OpenSAML can now optionally be installed by building from source; however, this is not yet fully documented.

Before starting, please sign up for all applicable mailing lists. Announcements pertinent to Shibboleth deployments and developments and resources for deployment assistance can be found here.

Please send any questions, concerns, or eventual confusion to . This should include, but not be limited to, questions about the documentation, undocumented problems, installation or operational issues, and anything else that arises. Please ensure that you have the appropriate .tarball for your operating system. Thank you for your help in testing Shibboleth.





Shibboleth Target -- Table of Contents


  1. Shibboleth Overview

    1. Origin
    2. Target
    3. WAYF
    4. Clubs
  2. Planning

    1. Requirements
    2. Join a Club
    3. Security Considerations
    4. Server Certs
    5. Attribute Release Policies
    6. Designate Contacts
    7. Browser Requirements
    8. Clocks
    9. Other Considerations
  3. Installation

    1. Software Requirements
    2. Deploy the Shibboleth Package
    3. Configure Apache
  4. Getting Running

    1. Configuring shibboleth.ini
    2. Dynamic Error Page Generation
    3. Key Generation and Certificate Installation
    4. Protecting Webpages
    5. Designing AAP's
    6. Using Attributes in Applications
    7. Add SHAR plug-ins for attribute processing
  5. Troubleshooting

    1. Basic Testing
    2. Common Problems



License Information


Before proceeding with any installation of, implementation of, or any other use of Shibboleth or its code, read and agree to the usage terms put forth in the LICENSE file included in the tarballs. Note that Shibboleth is based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), a proposed standard in the OASIS organization. There are intellectual property claims on SAML technology that are published on the OASIS site. Shibboleth deployers are encouraged to evaluate these claims and respond to them as they see fit.




1. Shibboleth Overview

Shibboleth is a system designed to exchange attributes across realms for the primary purpose of authorization. It provides a secure framework for one organization to transmit attributes about a web-browsing individual across security domains to another institution. In the primary usage case, when a user attempts to access a resource at a remote domain, the user's own home security domain can send certain information about that user to the target site in a trusted exchange. These attributes can then be used by the resource to help determine whether to grant the user access to the resource. The user may have the ability to decide whether to release specific attributes to certain sites by specifying personal Attribute Release Policies (ARP's), effectively preserving privacy while still granting access based on trusted information.

When a user first tries to access a resource protected by Shibboleth, they are redirected to a service which asks the user to specify the organization from which they want to authenticate. If the user has not yet locally authenticated to a WebISO service, the user will then be redirected to their home institution's authentication system. After the user authenticates, the Shibboleth components at the local institution will generate a temporary reference to the user, known as a handle, for the individual and send this to the target site. The target site can then use the handle to ask for attributes about this individual. Based on these attributes, the target can decide whether or not to grant access to the resource. The user may then be allowed to access the requested materials.

There are several controls on privacy in Shibboleth, and mechanisms are provided to allow users to determine exactly which information about them is released. A user's actual identity isn't necessary for many access control decisions, so privacy often is needlessly compromised. Instead, the resource often utilizes other attributes that are after they are associated with an identity, such as faculty member or member of a certain class. Shibboleth provides a way to mutually refer to the same principal without revealing that principal's identity. Because the user is initially known to the target site only by a randomly generated temporary handle, if sufficient, the target site might know no more about the user than that the user is a member of the origin organization. This handle should never be used to decide whether or not to grant access, and is intended only as a temporary reference for requesting attributes.

1.a. Origin

There are four primary components to the origin side in Shibboleth: the Attribute Authority (AA), the Handle Service (HS), the directory service, and the local sign-on system (SSO). The AA and HS are provided with Shibboleth, and an open-source WebISO solution produced by the University of Washington known as Pubcookie is also supplied; the directory is provided by the origin site. Shibboleth is able to interface with a directory exporting an LDAP interface or a SQL database containing user attributes, and is designed such that programming interfaces to other repositories should be readily implemented. Shibboleth relies on standard web server mechanisms to trigger local authentication. A .htaccess file can be easily used to trigger either the local WebISO system or the web server's own Basic Auth mechanism, which will likely utilize an enterprise authentication system, such as Kerberos.

From the origin site's point of view, the first contact will be the redirection of a user to the handle service, which will then consult the SSO system to determine whether the user has already been authenticated. If not, then the browser user will be asked to authenticate, and then sent back to the target URL with a handle bundled in an attribute assertion. Next, a request from the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR) will arrive at the AA which will include the previously mentioned handle. The AA then consults the ARP's for the directory entry corresponding to the handle, queries the directory for these attributes, and releases to the SHAR all attributes the SHAR is entitled to know about that user.

1.b. Target

There are three primary components to the target side in Shibboleth: the Shibboleth Indexical Reference Establisher (SHIRE), the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR), and the resource manager (RM). An implementation of each of these is included in the standard Shibboleth distribution. These components are intended to run on the same web server.

From the target's point of view, a browser will hit the RM with a request for a Shibboleth-protected resource. The RM then allows the SHIRE to step in, which will use the WAYF to acquire the name of a handle service to ask about the user. The handle service (HS) will then reply with a SAML authentication assertion containing a handle, which the SHIRE then hands off to the SHAR. The SHAR uses the handle and the supplied address of the corresponding attribute authority (AA) to request all attributes it is allowed to know about the handle. The SHAR performs some basic validation and analysis based on attribute acceptance policies (AAP's). These attributes are then handed off to the RM, which is responsible for using these attributes to decide whether to grant access.

1.c. Where are you from? (WAYF)

The WAYF service can be either outsourced and operated by a club or deployed as part of the SHIRE. It is responsible for allowing a user to associate themself with an institution of their specification, then redirecting the user to the known address for the handle service of that institution.

1.d. Clubs

A Shibboleth club provides part of the underlying trust required for function of the Shibboleth architecture. A club is a group of organizations(universities, corporations, content providers, etc.) who agree to exchange attributes using the SAML/Shibboleth protocols and abide by a common set of policies and practices. In so doing, they must implicitly or explicitly agree to a common set of guidelines. Joining a club is not explicitly necessary for operation of Shibboleth, but it dramatically expands the number of targets and origins that can interact without defining bilateral agreements between all these parties.

A club can be created in a variety of formats and trust models, but must provide a certain set of services to club members. It needs to supply a registry to process applications to the club and distribute membership information to the origin and target sites. This must include distribution of the PKI components necessary for trust between origins and targets. There also needs to be a set of agreements and best practices defined by the club governing the exchange, use, and population of attributes before and after transit, and there should be a way to find information on local authentication and authorization practices for club members.






2. Planning

There are several essential elements that must be present in the environment to ensure Shibboleth functions well, both political and technical. Shibboleth currently runs on a specific range of platforms and web server environments. The SHAR and SHIRE are implemented entirely in C/C++. These are the recommendations and requirements for a successful Shibboleth implementation.

2.a. Requirements

Shibboleth currently only supports Linux and Solaris. At present, Shibboleth consists of Apache plugins and a separate SHAR process. The plugins use the ONC RPC mechanism to communicate with the SHAR. The target's web servers must be running Apache 1.3.26+. More precise technical details are discussed in 3.a.

2.b. Join a Club

While it is not necessary for a target or origin to join a club, doing so greatly facilitates the implementation of multilateral trust relationships. Each club will have a different application process.

To join Club Shib for the testing period, please containing the following information:

  • The name of the organization
  • Commonly accessed URL trees(Optional)
  • The attributes you will typically need released to you for access(Optional)
  • Club contact names and addresses for both administrative and technical purposes

For more information on Clubs, refer to 1.d or the Shibboleth v1.0 architectural document.

2.c. Security Considerations

Shibboleth's protocols and software have been extensively engineered to provide protection against many attacks. However, the most secure protocol can be compromised if it is placed in an insecure environment. To ensure Shibboleth is as secure as possible, there are several recommended security precautions which should be in place at local sites.

  1. SSL use is optional for target sites. Club guidelines should be considered when determining whether to implement SSL, and, in general, SSL should be used for interactions with client machines to provide the necessary authentication and encryption to ensure protection from man-in-the-middle attacks. It is strongly suggested that all password traffic or similarly sensitive data should be SSL-protected. Assessment of the risk tradeoff against possible performance degradation should be performed for all applications.

  2. Many other attacks can be made on the several redirection steps that Shibboleth takes to complete attribute transfer. The best protection against this is safeguarding the WAYF service and ensuring that rogue targets and origins are not used, generally by development of the trust model underneath Shibboleth. Shibboleth also leverages DNS for security, which is not uncommon, but attacks concerning bad domain information should be considered.

  3. Information regarding origin users is generally provided by the authoritative enterprise directory, and the acceptance of requests from target applications can be carefully restricted to ensure that all requests the SHAR performs are authorized and all information the origin provides is accurate. Use of plaintext passwords is strongly advised against.

  4. Server platforms should be properly secured, commensurate with the level that would be expected for a campus' other security services, and cookie stores on client machines should be well protected.

2.d. Server Certs

In the Shibboleth architecture, the SHAR, HS, and AA must all have various client and/or server certificates for use in signing assertions and creating SSL channels. These should be issued by a commonly accepted CA, which may be stipulated by some Club rules. For the Shibboleth Alpha 2 testing, the following CA's will be recognized by Club Shib:

* The certificates issued by these CA's will expire fairly quickly and should only be used for testing.

OSU will also provide a test CA to be used during Shibboleth development. Thawte presently issues certificates with extKeyUsage restrictions that make them incompatible with Shibboleth.

2.e. Attribute Release Policies

The Attribute Authority maintains a set of rules called Attribute Release Policies (ARP's) that define which attributes are released to which targets. When a browser user tries to access a resource, the SHAR asks the origin site AA to release all the attributes it is allowed to know. The SHAR provides its own name and an optional URL which can further refine the information the SHAR is allowed to know. The AA processes this request using all applicable ARP's, determines which attributes and values it will release, and then obtains the values actually associated with the browser user. The AA sends these attributes and values back to the SHAR.

Targets should work together with expected origin sites to ensure that the sets of attributes that both sites expect to correspond using are congruent. The format, evaluation, and designs of ARP's will change very significantly before subsequent releases. Additional documentation will be provided for the new ARP design.

2.f. Designate Contacts

Since Shibboleth deals both with daily technical and operational issues and also with contractual issues, a set of contacts should be set up to support the user base and to facilitate interactions with other Shibboleth sites and club members. It is recommended that at least technical and administrative contacts be designated. Names, titles, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers may all be useful information to provide.

2.g. Browser Requirements

A primary Shibboleth design consideration was to require very little or no modification to client machines. The only requirement is that a browser is used which supports cookies, redirection and SSL. Browser users will have to perform an additional click to submit the authentication assertion if _javascript_ is not functional.

2.h. Clocks

NTP should be run on all web servers. Shibboleth employs a short handle issuance time to protect against replay attacks. Because of this, any significant degree of clock skew can hinder the ability of users to access sites successfully.

2.i. Other Considerations

Especially for higher education, there are a handful of laws enacted which may have important ramifications on the disclosure of personal information and attributes. Since Shibboleth does not necessarily need to transmit identity, it is an ideal solution for many higher education situations. Nevertheless, all parties within the United States of America are strongly advised to consult the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974(FERPA), and all other relevant state and federal legislation before deploying Shibboleth.





3. Installation

3.a. Software Requirements

Operating System:
  • RedHat 7.2:
    • Apache 1.3.26+

      Apache must be compiled with mod_so for DSO module support, and must include SSL support(preferably using mod_ssl), and EAPI support (which mod_ssl requires and provides). Shibboleth can coexist with mod_auth, which may be compiled or loaded into the server for use elsewhere, but Shibboleth does not need or use it. The most recent Red Hat RPM (1.3.23-14 as of this writing) is sufficient.

    • Shibboleth v0.7 for RedHat
    • openssl-0.9.6g
    • libstdc++3-3.0.4-1.i386.rpm and libgcc-3.0.4-1.i386.rpm

      Shibboleth is currently built with GCC 3, and requires these specific library versions. They are available as GCC3 RPMs and are available in the RedHat 7.2 updates directory on any RedHat mirror.

    • Portions of the libphp4 Apache plugin are written in C++, as is Shibboleth. If a site wants to use libphp4.so, then it must ensure that the binary version they are using and Shibboleth will use the same version of libstdc++. The best way to do this is to recompile libphp4 using the same version of GCC that was used to compile the current version of Shibboleth (GCCv3.04 for Linux).
  • RedHat 7.3:
    • RedHat 7.3 installations must be current with all SSL and Apache security patches issued by RedHat.
    • Apache 1.3.26+

      Apache must be compiled with mod_so for DSO module support, and must include SSL support(preferably using mod_ssl), and EAPI support (which mod_ssl requires and provides). Shibboleth can coexist with mod_auth, which may be compiled or loaded into the server for use elsewhere, but Shibboleth does not need or use it. The most recent Red Hat RPM (1.3.23-14 as of this writing) is sufficient.

    • libstdc++3-3.0.4-1.i386.rpm and libgcc-3.0.4-1.i386.rpm

      Shibboleth is currently built with GCC 3, and requires these specific library versions. They are available as GCC3 RPMs and are available in the RedHat 7.2 updates directory on any RedHat mirror.

    • Shibboleth v0.7 for RedHat
    • Portions of the libphp4 Apache plugin are written in C++, as is Shibboleth. If a site wants to use libphp4.so, then it must ensure that the binary version they are using and Shibboleth will use the same version of libstdc++. The best way to do this is to recompile libphp4 using the same version of GCC that was used to compile the current version of Shibboleth (GCCv3.04 for Linux).
  • Solaris 2.8:
    • Apache 1.3.27

      Apache must be compiled with mod_so for DSO module support, and must include SSL support(preferably using mod_ssl) and EAPI support (which mod_ssl requires and provides). Shibboleth can coexist with mod_auth, which may be compiled or loaded into the server for use elsewhere, but Shibboleth does not need or use it.

    • openssl-0.9.6g
    • libgcc3.2
    • Shibboleth v0.7 for Solaris
    • Portions of the libphp4 Apache plugin are written in C++, as is Shibboleth. If a site wants to use libphp4.so, then it must ensure that the binary version they are using and Shibboleth will use the same version of libstdc++. The best way to do this is to recompile libphp4 using the same version of GCC that was used to compile the current version of Shibboleth (GCCv3.2 for Solaris).

3.b. Deploy the Shibboleth Package

For the sake of clarity, this deployment guide assumes that standard directories are used for all installations. These directories may be changed for local implementations, but must be done so consistently.

  1. Ensure that you have obtained the proper tarball for your operating system.

  2. Expand the tarball into /opt/shibboleth. You should see the following directory structure:

    $ ls -al
    drwxr-xr-x 10 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:54 .
    drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 24 00:37 ..
    drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:54 bin
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 24 02:11 doc
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:54 etc
    drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:54 include
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:55 lib
    drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 24 03:55 libexec
    drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Oct 24 02:11 man
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 24 02:02 share

3.c. Configure Apache

  1. Shibboleth includes configuration directives in the file /opt/shibboleth/etc/apache.config which must be added to the httpd.conf file used locally. It is recommended that these directives simply be added to the end of the existing httpd.conf file rather than trying to merge it in-line; step 2 describes the necessary modifications to the Apache startup script. The default configuration will often work, but if customization is necessary, these options may be modified:

    LoadModule <module> <pathname>

    Specifies the title and location of the shibrm_module resource manager and shire_module SHIRE modules. These are installed by default at /opt/shibboleth/libexec/mod_shibrm.so and /opt/shibboleth/libexec/mod_shire.so

    SHIREConfig <pathname>

    Specifies the pathname of the SHIRE's configuration file. Defaults to /opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shibboleth.ini.

    SHIREURL <url>
    <Location <url>>
      SetHandler <method>
    </Location>

    Specifies the URL and the method the target uses to handle requests for Shibboleth-protected resources. Currently, shib-shire-post is the only available handler method. SHIREURL is used by Shibboleth when re-directing the user to the WAYF and <Location> by Apache; for this reason, both URL specifications must match. Note that the configuration file itself contains <>'s, and Location should not be replaced.

    The referenced URL can be either a partial path or an absolute URL. The partial path allows each virtual server to use its own hostname and port in the SHIRE for session cookie purposes, while the absolute URL forces HTTP virtual servers to use HTTPS for the SHIRE. Use of a full https:// URL is advised.

    ShibMapAttribute <attribute-uri> <HTTP-header> [alias]

    Registers attributes to be recognized and maps them to an authorization alias for use in .htaccess files or Location Blocks with require directives. REMOTE_USER is a special case, suggested for use with eduPersonPrincipalName, and is automatically checked by a require user rule.

  2. These modifications must be made to the Apache startup script:

    Add the following environment variables:

    LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/shibboleth/lib; export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
    SHIBCONFIG=/opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/shibboleth.ini; export SHIBCONFIG

    If the SHIBCONFIG environment variable is not specified, Shibboleth will use /etc/shibboleth.ini by default.

  3. The SHAR must be started before Apache. Among other methods, this can be done either by creating a separate SHAR startup script or by modifying Apache's RC script to start/stop the SHAR before httpd. It is suggested that Apache's script be modified by adding:

    /opt/shibboleth/bin/shar &

    Sample init.d scripts may be included with future releases. Ensure that the environment variables referenced in 3.c.2 are in place.

  4. The options in shibboleth.ini must be configured as documented in 4.a. Apache content will then need to be modified for Shibboleth authentication. This is discussed in 4.d. It is recommended that the target then be tested as detailed in section 5.a.




4. Getting Running

4.a. Configuring shibboleth.ini

Most of the configuration for the SHAR, SHIRE, and RM is stored in the file shibboleth.ini. This file is split into four pre-defined sections: general, shire, shar, and extensions. The general section holds global tags, used by all pieces. The shire and shar sections can override the general tags with SHIRE- or SHAR-specific configuration. For example, if the SHAR is looking for a tag, it will look first in the shar section; if it does not find the tag there, it will proceed to look in the general section. The extensions section enumerates the set of extra SAML modules to load at run-time, though this section will likely not need configuration for most v0.7 deployments. Example configuration files may be found in the Shibboleth CVS.

There is also information that must be configured in /usr/local/apache/conf/httpd.conf; for more information, refer to 3.c.

Information in the logger files referenced by shibboleth.ini may require additional configuration. It is recommended that after initial installation is completed, the log level in both files be changed to either INFO or WARN.

[general]:
logger = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the log4cpp configuration file for most Shibboleth events. This element may also be optionally specified for each of the components individually. Default logging settings should suffice. The syslog daemon must accept UDP:514 messages, and on Linux, SYSLOGD_OPTIONS must include -r to enable logging from remote machines. The logging levels are defined in the logger configuration. Log4cpp's homepage provides more information.

schemadir = <pathname>

Specifies the directory in which the XML schema files are located; defaults to /opt/shibboleth/etc/shibboleth/. Note that the pathname must have a trailing /.

sitesFile = <url>

Specifies the location of the Sites file that maps common names to recognized HS'. Recall that file:// may be used to specify a local document. The default value of http://wayf.internet2.edu/shibboleth/sites.xml is appropriate for testing with Club Shib.

The next segment of the [general] configuration section defines server-specific tags in sections defined by the server name for use by the SHIRE and RM. For example, if you have a web server at www.example.edu, you can define a section [www.example.edu] and override global tags with tags for that server only.

The following table lists the server-specific tags. It is broken into mandatory tags, and optional tags. As always, you can put tags in the [general] section for all servers, and then override specific tags on a per-server basis:

[<FQDN>]:
wayfURL = <url>

Specifies the URL of the WAYF service the user is redirected to. Clubs will generally provide this URL or provide information on how to locally host WAYF's with a distributed hosts file. The default value of https://wayf.internet2.edu/shibboleth/WAYF is appropriate for testing with Club Shib.

shireSSLOnly = <true/false>

If true, the SHIRE will reject HTTP connections that are not SSL-protected. Use of SSL is strongly recommended; see section 2.c for more information.

wayfError = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the template for the error page generated when there is an error re-directing the user to the WAYF or processing a SHIRE POST.

rmError = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the template for the error page generated if internal errors occur in the RM.

accessError = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the template for the page displayed to users when access to a protected resource is denied by the RM.

(optional):
normalizeRequest = <true/false>

If true, all redirects generated by mod_shire will be created using the virtual server name assigned to the server containing this command. If false, the browser's supplied URL is used to compute the redirect back.

checkIPAddress = <true/false>

If true, Shibboleth will check client addresses for impersonation protection. In most circumstances, this should be enabled to prevent certain attacks concerning stolen cookies. Defaults to false.

supportContact = <e-mail>

Specifies the e-mail address used in the generation of error pages.

logoLocation = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the logo used in the generation of error pages. This logo can be in any format that the web browser will understand.

[shire]:

There are currently no SHIRE-specific tags defined.

[shar]:
certFile = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the PEM-encoded certificate used by the SHAR to communicate with AA's.

keyFile = <pathname>

Specifies the location of the PEM-encoded private key used by the SHAR to communicate with AA's.

keyPass = <password>

Specifies the password used to access the keyfile. Note that the module needs access to these files from within the Apache child processes, which generally runs as something other than root, and may not have access to the key-pair used by mod_ssl without permission changes. The issues surrounding how to securely obtain a key while running as nobody will be addressed in a later release.

calist = <pathname>

Specifies a single file of PEM-encoded certificates containing the certificates of root CA's the SHAR will consider valid signers of AA certificates.

The [extensions] section is the list of SAML modules to be iteratively loaded at run-time. [extensions]:

<module-name>

The name of the module -- the value is the path to the Shared Object(.so) that SAML should load at runtime.

4.b. Dynamic Error Page Generation

Shibboleth supports the dynamic generation of information in error pages referenced by shibboleth.ini. The Shib Target employs a special Markup Language Processor to insert special tags into the generated HTML. The parser will read the error file looking for any tag that looks like:

<shibmlp tag-name />

Shibboleth will replace tag-name with the appropriate markup tag from the table below:

supportContact The value of the supportContact for this server.
logoLocation The value of the logoLocation for this server.
requestURL The user's requested URL.
errorType The type of error.
errorText The actual error message.

This configuration is for servers. Apache configurations must be defined for content protection. See section 4.d.

4.c. Key Generation and Certificate Installation

The only target component that must have a private key and certificate is the SHAR, which is implemented within the Apache module. While the target server itself should support SSL in most cases, it is mandatory for the SHAR to authenticate when contacting an AA, and it must therefore be given a key and an SSL client certificate. It is permissible for the SHAR to use the same keypair and certificate used by the target server itself, provided the certificate is signed by a CA accepted by the community of sites. In this case, it doubles as both an SSL server and an SSL client certificate.

The SHAR is assigned a key and a certificate using shibboleth.ini's certfile, keyfile and keypass, described in 4.a. These files must currently be in PEM format. OpenSSL commands to generate a new keypair and a certificate request are shown here, assuming RSA keys are to be used:

$ openssl genrsa -des3 -out ssl.key 2048 $ openssl req -new -key ssl.key -out ssl.csr

The signed certificate file returned by the CA should be usable directly, or can be converted to PEM format using the openssl x509 command.

The key and certificate files can be placed anywhere, though in or beneath /usr/local/apache/conf directory is a good choice. The Apache child processes, often running as nobody, must be able to read them while the server is running, which may require permission changes.

This particularly applies when sharing the key and certificate used by mod_ssl, which are only readable by root by default. The password, if any, must be placed in the conf file, since the module cannot prompt for it as the initial startup of mod_ssl can. The issues surrounding how to securely obtain a key while running as nobody will be addressed in a later release. Since the password will be stored in clear text in a frequently examined file, it is suggested to not reuse a password used elsewhere, or to place the keypass directive in a separate file that is Included in the main configuration file, so that its permissions can be further restricted.

Finally, the calist command provides the SHAR with a set of CA roots to trust when validating AA server certificates. In all cases, the SHAR verifies that the certificate's CN equals the AA's hostname, but the CA root bundle restricts the acceptable signers to those permitted by the SHAR. The parameter can be omitted to skip such signer validation. Section 2.d lists the CA's currently recognized by Club Shib.

4.d. Protecting Webpages

Protection of webpages is primarily achieved through "mapping" attributes provided by an AA to a localized vocabulary for authorization rules. Each attribute can be mapped using the ShibMapAttribute command to an HTTP header name where it can subsequently be accessed by applications, and optionally to an alias that can be used in a Require command to search for a matching value. This mapping command must be in httpd.conf, while the rest of the commands described here appear in content-specific configuration or .htaccess files.

Any of the typical ways of protecting content may be used (.htaccess, Directory, Location, Files, etc.). There are two ways to trigger Shibboleth authentication: specifying an AuthType of shibboleth to use Shibboleth directly, or specifying ShibBasicHijack On to process existing .htaccess files using Shibboleth instead. Support for authorization consists of mod_auth-style require directives, as well as support for mod_auth group files.

A complete list of the directives and their values is below:

AuthType <string>

Use shibboleth for direct invocation, or Basic plus the ShibBasicHijack On option described below.

ShibSSLOnly<on/off>

Controls whether Shibboleth will reject non-SSL requests from clients. Defaults to off.

ShibBasicHijack <on/off>

Controls whether Shibboleth should or should not ignore requests for AuthType Basic. Defaults to off.

ShibAuthTimeout <seconds>

Sets the maximum number of seconds without any user activity that a session will remain alive. After seconds seconds without activity, the session is considered dead. Omission or 0 results in an arbitrary session timeout.

ShibExportAssertion <on/off>

Controls whether the SAML attribute assertion provided by the AA is exported in a base64-encoded HTTP header, Shib-Attributes. Defaults to off.

ShibAuthLifetime <seconds>

Sets the maximum lifetime in seconds that a user session can survive. Omission or zero results in arbitrary session lifetime.

AuthGroupFile <pathname>

Same as mod_auth; collects EPPN's into a named group for access control. Note that mod_auth will not support group files when mod_shib is loaded, since they share the same command.

This is implemented by placing a .htaccess file that references an AuthGroupFile stored at /path:

authgroupfile /path
require group workgroup

Note that an AuthGroupFile used by Shibboleth would resemble workgroup: , , .

Require <string>

Enforce authorization using one of the following methods:

  • valid-user

    Any Shibboleth user from a trusted origin site is accepted.

  • user

    A space-delimited list of EPPN values, provided that the urn:mace:eduPerson:1.0:eduPersonPrincipalName attribute has been mapped to the REMOTE_USER header (as per the earlier example configuration commands).

  • group

    A space-delimited list of group names defined within AuthGroupFile files, again provided that the mapping to REMOTE_USER exists.

  • <alias>

    An arbitrary rule tag that matches an alias defined in a ShibMapAttribute server command. The rule value is a space- delimited list of attribute values, whose format depends on the attribute in question (e.g. an affiliation rule might look like Require affiliation ).


4.e. Designing AAP's

Shibboleth allows a user and a site to release a varying set of attributes to a destination site, and does not impose restrictions on the kinds of attribute information provided by an AA. Target implementations must also be prepared to examine the attributes they receive and filter them based on policies about what information to permit an origin site to assert about its users.

Future versions may support more complex policy-based attribute acceptance, but the current implementation imposes a simple AAP that requires any "scoped" attribute, such as EPPN or affiliation, to be scoped only to the origin site's domain. In other words, the osu.edu origin site is only permitted to assert an EPPN value of the form <name>@osu.edu. Subdomains and disjoint domains are not supported by the supplied attribute plugin, which is implemented by the eduPerson module.

For now, customizing this policy requires that a new module be plugged in to implement a different set of rules, just as if an entirely new attribute were to be supported.

4.f. Using Attributes in Applications

Apart from the simple RM functionality provided, attribute information may be made available directly to applications via the standard practice of creating custom HTTP request headers before passing control to the application. Applications should make no assumption about the presence of specific attributes for their use unless they have intimate knowledge of the attribute release policies in place.

The ShibMapAttribute directive controls this interface, and maps a Shibboleth attribute (identified by an unambiguous URI) to a header name, such as Shib-EP-Affiliation. Using that example, any values of the mapped attribute will be placed in that header, delimited by spaces. An application that uses a CGI-like syntax to access the header will find the values in the HTTP_SHIB_EP_AFFILIATION variable. Using the command, any attribute can be placed in any header, to drive legacy applications that expect information in a particular header.

The REMOTE_USER variable is a special case that is generally populated automatically by the web server based on an internal piece of data that represents the user's username. Unlike many authentication modules, Shibboleth does not guarantee that REMOTE_USER will have any value. If it does, it is set solely based on a ShibMapAttribute command. For most purposes, the urn:mace:eduPerson:1.0:eduPersonPrincipalName attribute should be mapped to REMOTE_USER. Even so, EPPN may not be provided by the AA, and REMOTE_USER might still be empty.

Finally, the ShibExportAssertion flag instructs the module to place the entire XML message containing the SAML attribute information from the AA into a base64-encoded header called Shib-Attributes. This is a raw interface that provides an application with the entire AA response, and is not a filtered view based on any attribute acceptance rules or even based on what attributes are recognized by the target. What was sent is what you see.

4.g. Add SHAR Plug-Ins for attribute processing

In order for an attribute to be used by Shibboleth, it must be recognized as valid by the SHAR and implemented with any specific rules for how to understand and express its value based on the XML from the AA. The eduPerson module is an example of a plugin that provides this support for an initial set of eduPerson-base attributes. Extension modules like this are loaded at run time. New modules may be added to the extensions section of shibboleth.ini.

The eduPerson module provides a simple example of how to build such a plugin for other attributes. It is a shared library loaded by SAML to register the attributes it supports. More files, information, and eduPerson.xsd may be found trolling through the Shibboleth CVS.




5. Troubleshooting

This section provides basic information about testing Shibboleth targets. This information is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead rudimentary guidelines for basic configuration tests and problems. For more detailed information or answers to specific problems not addressed in this section, please mail with a thorough description of errors and configurations used.

5.a. Basic Testing

The target may be tested by generating a folder with very basic access controls on it, and accessing it using a web browser. Place a simple webpage such as index.html in /secure/. Then, add the following lines to httpd.conf, which should be removed when testing is over:

# Configure a test directory
<Location /secure>
  AuthType shibboleth
  require valid-user

  # Per-directory SHIRE Configuration
  #ShibBasicHijack On
  #ShibSSLOnly On
  #ShibAuthLifetime 60
  #ShibAuthTimeout 600

  # RM Configuration
  #AuthGroupFile /foo
  #ShibExportAssertion On
</Location>

For information regarding specific error messages that may be generated if the target does not work successfully, please refer to section 4.b, or write .

5.b. Common Problems

This release represents an extensive rewrite of the target side code. As a knowledge base develops around the new target, problems commonly encountered will be summarized here. At this point, please mail with any questions or problems encountered.

Title: Shibboleth Origin Deployment Guide

Shibboleth Origin Deployment Guide

Shibboleth Origin Deployment Guide
draft-internet2-mace-shibboleth-shib-origin-deploy-19.html
Nate Klingenstein
26 November, 2002
Comments should be directed to .

Shibboleth v0.7 has some limitations and lacks certain security provisions which will be present in the final version. It is strongly advised that this version not be used to protect any sensitive data. Some sections of the deploy guide have not yet been populated with text. This document describes additional functionality which will be present in the final version, but which is not implemented in the v0.7, including but not limited to:

  • Some security features, including authentication of SHARs, and support for non-trivial certificate validation processes beyond simple CA validation.

  • Bundling of SSO or WebISO systems.

  • Any support for customized target side AAP's, except by writing an Apache module to implement the desired policy. As shipped, EPPN and eduPersonAffiliation are only accepted from the AA if the scope value is equal to the value of "domain" in the origin site HS's web.xml file, which will be the same as the name provided in registration with Club Shib.

  • Club Shib is only a rudimentary concept at this time, and no support for multiple clubs or club policies is provided. Registration with the Shibboleth project management team is required to interoperate with other test sites, unless peer to peer sharing of certificate information is undertaken. For more information about acquiring certificates accepted by Club Shib, please refer to section 2.d.

Functionality which has been added since the previous version (alpha-2.5) includes:

  • A completely new target side implementation. New features include separation of the SHAR and SHIRE, elimination of the need for Tomcat unless running a WAYF as well, and dynamic generation of error pages. Configuration and functionality are similar to what was found in alpha-2.5.
  • A new C/C++ based implementation of OpenSAML.
  • Shibboleth and OpenSAML can now optionally be installed by building from source; however, this is not yet fully documented.
  • The deployment of ARP's will change dramatically before the next release, rendering ARP's from v0.7 incompatible.

Before starting, please sign up for all applicable mailing lists. Announcements pertinent to Shibboleth deployments and developments and resources for deployment assistance can be found here.

Please send any questions, concerns, or eventual confusion to . This should include, but not be limited to, questions about the documentation, undocumented problems, installation or operational issues, and anything else that arises. Please ensure that you have the appropriate .tarball for your operating system. Thank you for your help in testing Shibboleth.





Shibboleth Origin -- Table of Contents


  1. Shibboleth Overview

    1. Origin
    2. Target
    3. WAYF
    4. Clubs
  2. Planning

    1. Requirements
    2. Join a Club
    3. Security Considerations
    4. Server Certs
    5. Attribute Release Policies
    6. Designate Contacts
    7. Browser Requirements
    8. Clocks
    9. Other Considerations
  3. Installation

    1. Software Requirements
    2. Deploy HS and AA
    3. Implement a MySQL directory (optional)
  4. Getting Running

    1. Basic Configuration
    2. Key Generation and Certificate Installation
      1. Sharing certificate/key pairs between Apache and Java keystores (optional)
    3. Linking the Authentication System to the HS
    4. Deploying AA plug-ins for attributes(Java API)
    5. Establishing default ARP's for the origin community
    6. MyAA
  5. Advanced Configuration

    1. ARP Syntax
      1. Site ARP
      2. User ARP's
      3. ArpUtil
      4. MyAA
  6. Troubleshooting

    1. Basic Testing
    2. Logging
    3. Common Problems



License Information


Before proceeding with any installation of, implementation of, or any other use of Shibboleth or its code, read and agree to the usage terms put forth in the LICENSE file included in the tarballs. Note that Shibboleth is based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), a proposed standard in the OASIS organization. There are intellectual property claims on SAML technology that are published on the OASIS site. Shibboleth deployers are encouraged to evaluate these claims and respond to them as they see fit.




1. Shibboleth Overview

Shibboleth is a system designed to exchange attributes across realms for the primary purpose of authorization. It provides a secure framework for one organization to transmit attributes about a web-browsing individual across security domains to another institution. In the primary usage case, when a user attempts to access a resource at a remote domain, the user's own home security domain can send certain information about that user to the target site in a trusted exchange. These attributes can then be used by the resource to help determine whether to grant the user access to the resource. The user may have the ability to decide whether to release specific attributes to certain sites by specifying personal Attribute Release Policies (ARP's), effectively preserving privacy while still granting access based on trusted information.

When a user first tries to access a resource protected by Shibboleth, they are redirected to a service which asks the user to specify the organization from which they want to authenticate. If the user has not yet locally authenticated to a WebISO service, the user will then be redirected to their home institution's authentication system. After the user authenticates, the Shibboleth components at the local institution will generate a temporary reference to the user, known as a handle, for the individual and send this to the target site. The target site can then use the handle to ask for attributes about this individual. Based on these attributes, the target can decide whether or not to grant access to the resource. The user may then be allowed to access the requested materials.

There are several controls on privacy in Shibboleth, and mechanisms are provided to allow users to determine exactly which information about them is released. A user's actual identity isn't necessary for many access control decisions, so privacy often is needlessly compromised. Instead, the resource often utilizes other attributes that are after they are associated with an identity, such as faculty member or member of a certain class. Shibboleth provides a way to mutually refer to the same principal without revealing that principal's identity. Because the user is initially known to the target site only by a randomly generated temporary handle, if sufficient, the target site might know no more about the user than that the user is a member of the origin organization. This handle should never be used to decide whether or not to grant access, and is intended only as a temporary reference for requesting attributes.

1.a. Origin

There are four primary components to the origin side in Shibboleth: the Attribute Authority (AA), the Handle Service (HS), the directory service, and the local sign-on system (SSO). The AA and HS are provided with Shibboleth, and an open-source WebISO solution produced by the University of Washington known as Pubcookie is also supplied; the directory is provided by the origin site. Shibboleth is able to interface with a directory exporting an LDAP interface or a SQL database containing user attributes, and is designed such that programming interfaces to other repositories should be readily implemented. Shibboleth relies on standard web server mechanisms to trigger local authentication. A .htaccess file can be easily used to trigger either the local WebISO system or the web server's own Basic Auth mechanism, which will likely utilize an enterprise authentication system, such as Kerberos.

From the origin site's point of view, the first contact will be the redirection of a user to the handle service, which will then consult the SSO system to determine whether the user has already been authenticated. If not, then the browser user will be asked to authenticate, and then sent back to the target URL with a handle bundled in an attribute assertion. Next, a request from the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR) will arrive at the AA which will include the previously mentioned handle. The AA then consults the ARP's for the directory entry corresponding to the handle, queries the directory for these attributes, and releases to the SHAR all attributes the SHAR is entitled to know about that user.

1.b. Target

There are three primary components to the target side in Shibboleth: the Shibboleth Indexical Reference Establisher (SHIRE), the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR), and the resource manager (RM). An implementation of each of these is included in the standard Shibboleth distribution. These components are intended to run on the same web server.

From the target's point of view, a browser will hit the RM with a request for a Shibboleth-protected resource. The RM then allows the SHIRE to step in, which will use the WAYF to acquire the name of a handle service to ask about the user. The handle service (HS) will then reply with a SAML authentication assertion containing a handle, which the SHIRE then hands off to the SHAR. The SHAR uses the handle and the supplied address of the corresponding attribute authority (AA) to request all attributes it is allowed to know about the handle. The SHAR performs some basic validation and analysis based on attribute acceptance policies (AAP's). These attributes are then handed off to the RM, which is responsible for using these attributes to decide whether to grant access.

1.c. Where are you from? (WAYF)

The WAYF service can be either outsourced and operated by a club or deployed as part of the SHIRE. It is responsible for allowing a user to associate themself with an institution of their specification, then redirecting the user to the known address for the handle service of that institution.

1.d. Clubs

A Shibboleth club provides part of the underlying trust required for function of the Shibboleth architecture. A club is a group of organizations(universities, corporations, content providers, etc.) who agree to exchange attributes using the SAML/Shibboleth protocols and abide by a common set of policies and practices. In so doing, they must implicitly or explicitly agree to a common set of guidelines. Joining a club is not explicitly necessary for operation of Shibboleth, but it dramatically expands the number of targets and origins that can interact without defining bilateral agreements between all these parties.

A club can be created in a variety of formats and trust models, but must provide a certain set of services to club members. It needs to supply a registry to process applications to the club and distribute membership information to the origin and target sites. This must include distribution of the PKI components necessary for trust between origins and targets. There also needs to be a set of agreements and best practices defined by the club governing the exchange, use, and population of attributes before and after transit, and there should be a way to find information on local authentication and authorization practices for club members.






2. Planning

There are several essential elements that must be present in the environment to ensure Shibboleth functions well, both political and technical. Shibboleth is primarily written in Java on the origin side. These are the recommendations and requirements for a successful Shibboleth implementation.

2.a. Requirements

  • A common institutional directory service should be operational; Shibboleth comes with LDAP and MySQL abilities built in, and the Attribute Authority has a Java API which will allow specification of interfaces with legacy directories. This is discussed further in section 4.d.

  • A method to authenticate browser users must be in place, preferably in the form of an enterprise authentication service. Some form of an SSO or a WebISO service is not explicitly necessary for Shibboleth; however, without it, users will have to repeatedly authenticate to the home organization for each new target application domain they wish to visit. Implementation details of this are discussed in section 4.c.

  • Shibboleth currently only supports Linux and Solaris.

  • A web server must be deployed that can host Java servlets, Tomcat, and optionally a MySQL database(which may or may not be on the same server as the Shibboleth components).

2.b. Join a Club

While it is not necessary for a target or origin to join a club, doing so greatly facilitates the implementation of multilateral trust relationships. Each club will have a different application process.

To join Club Shib for the Alpha 2 test period, please containing the following information:

  • Domain Name of the origin site (e.g., Ohio State's is "osu.edu")
  • Complete URL to access the HS
  • The CN (usually the hostname) of the HS's certificate's subject
  • Any shorthand aliases the WAYF should support for the origin site (e.g., Ohio State, OSU, Buckeyes)
  • Club contact names and addresses

To interoperate with other sites in Club Shib, the HS will need to have a private key and associated certificate generated. When generating the certificate, the subject field will contain a CN attribute. Often, this will be the hostname of your Handle Service, particularly if the same key-pair and certificate will be used for SSL as well. While any name may be assigned that is acceptible to the signer of your certificate, using the hostname is strongly encouraged.

If, for some reason, the HS's URL is not yet known, but its hostname and CN have been determined, the URL may be supplied later. In the meantime, the WAYF will be unable to direct users to that HS, but any assertions from the site will still be accepted by club SHIRE's. When the site is accepted into the Club, its information is added to the sites file used by the WAYF and target sites.

For more information on Clubs, refer to 1.d or the Shibboleth v1.0 architectural document.

2.c. Security Considerations

Shibboleth's protocols and software have been extensively engineered to provide protection against many attacks. However, the most secure protocol can be compromised if it is placed in an insecure environment. To ensure Shibboleth is as secure as possible, there are several recommended security precautions which should be in place at local sites.

  1. SSL use is optional for origin sites. Club guidelines should be considered when determining whether to implement SSL, and, in general, SSL should be used for interactions with client machines to provide the necessary authentication and encryption to ensure protection from man-in-the-middle attacks. It is strongly suggested that all password traffic or similarly sensitive data should be SSL-protected. Assessment of the risk tradeoff against possible performance degradation should be performed for all applications.

  2. Many other attacks can be made on the several redirection steps that Shibboleth takes to complete attribute transfer. The best protection against this is safeguarding the WAYF service and ensuring that rogue targets and origins are not used, generally by development of the trust model underneath Shibboleth. Shibboleth also leverages DNS for security, which is not uncommon, but attacks concerning bad domain information should be considered.

  3. Information regarding origin users is generally provided by the authoritative enterprise directory, and the acceptance of requests from target applications can be carefully restricted to ensure that all requests the SHAR performs are authorized and all information the origin provides is accurate. Proper security measures should also be in place on directory access and population(see Access Control in the LDAP recipe for more information). Use of plaintext passwords is strongly advised against.

  4. Server platforms should be properly secured, commensurate with the level that would be expected for a campus' other security services, and cookie stores on client machines should be well protected.

2.d. Server Certs

In the Shibboleth architecture, the SHIRE, SHAR, HS, and AA must all have various client and/or server certificates for use in signing assertions and creating SSL channels. These should be issued by a commonly accepted CA, which may be stipulated by some Club rules. For the Shibboleth Alpha 2 testing, the following CA's will be recognized by Club Shib:

* The certificates issued by these CA's will expire fairly quickly and should only be used for testing.

OSU will also provide a test CA to be used during Shibboleth development. Thawte presently issues certificates with extKeyUsage restrictions that make them incompatible with Shibboleth.

2.e. Attribute Release Policies

The Attribute Authority maintains a set of rules called Attribute Release Policies (ARP's) that define which attributes are released to which targets. When a browser user tries to access a resource, the SHAR asks the origin site AA to release all the attributes it is allowed to know. The SHAR provides its own name and an optional URL which can further refine the information the SHAR is allowed to know. The AA processes this request using all applicable ARP's, determines which attributes and values it will release, and then obtains the values actually associated with the browser user. The AA sends these attributes and values back to the SHAR.

The set of ARP's that is applicable to a given request is determined by first matching the SHAR name against the ARP's. After one or more matching ARP's are found, the AA searches the URL trees pertaining to those ARP's. The closest matches are selected, and an appropriate list of attributes is evaluated combining the applicable ARP's with the attribute generation methods, usually querying the enterprise directory and applying the appropriate logic and packaging.

An ARP may be thought of as a sort of filter for outbound attributes; it cannot create attributes or data that weren't originally present, but it can limit the attributes released and the values those attributes may have when released. It does not change the information in the data sources in any way.

This information is then sent to the requesting SHAR. Although an arbitrary number of ARP's may be defined for an arbitrary number of SHAR's and URL trees within SHAR's, only the most precisely matching ARP is considered a match, and then used to determine the release of information to a target site. If no SHAR matches the query, the default set of attributes as defined by the AA will be released.

A special type of ARP is the site ARP, which applies to every user that an AA can vouch for, as opposed to user ARP's, which apply only to the pertinent user. Site ARP's are administratively created and maintained, with one set of site ARP's defined for a given AA. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include.

Site ARP's are formed in much the same way as user ARP's, with a couple noteworthy differences. Site ARP's may force the release of attributes or particular values to particular SHAR/URL combinations, and may also prohibit the release of attributes or particular values to particular SHAR/URL combinations. The other primary role of the site ARP is to define a default release policy that applies to all SHAR's that do not have an entry in either the applicable site ARP's or user ARP's. For privacy and security reasons, the default policy will generally be fairly restrictive. Site ARP's give administrators very powerful ways to apply trust relationships with information providers and other targets across an entire user base.

2.f. Designate Contacts

Since Shibboleth deals both with daily technical and operational issues and also with contractual issues, a set of contacts should be set up to support the user base and to facilitate interactions with other Shibboleth sites and club members. It is recommended that at least technical and administrative contacts be designated.

2.g. Browser Requirements

A primary Shibboleth design consideration was to require very little or no modification to client machines. The only requirement is that a browser is used which supports cookies, redirection and SSL. Browser users will have to perform an additional click to submit the authentication assertion if _javascript_ is not functional.

2.h. Clocks

NTP should be run on all web servers. Shibboleth employs a short handle issuance time to protect against replay attacks. Because of this, any significant degree of clock skew can hinder the ability of users to access sites successfully.

2.i. Other Considerations

Especially for higher education, there are a handful of laws enacted which may have important ramifications on the disclosure of personal information and attributes. Since Shibboleth does not necessarily need to transmit identity, it is an ideal solution for many higher education situations. Nevertheless, all parties within the United States of America are strongly advised to consult the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974(FERPA), and all other relevant state and federal legislation before deploying Shibboleth.





3. Installation

3.a. Software Requirements

  • Apache 1.3.26+
  • Apache Ant 1.5+
  • Tomcat 3.3.1 Java server
  • Sun JRE 1.3.1 (any subversion)

    Other versions of the JRE are not supported and are known to cause errors when working with certificates.

  • mod_jk

    You may need to build mod_jk against Apache, which will generally require GCC or a platform-specific C compiler.

  • An enterprise authentication mechanism

    Ideally, this will be a WebISO or SSO system such as the University of Washington's Pubcookie package. The minimal requirement is for the web server to be able to authenticate browser users and supply their identity to the Handle Server.

  • An enterprise directory service

    Shibboleth currently supports retrieving user attribute information from either LDAP or MySQL. For testing purposes, Shibboleth also supports a minimal echo responder which will always return two pre-defined attributes.

The origin can be built using a MySQL database to store handles or an in-memory method to store handles. Additionally, it's possible to define alternate storage methods using the API. (optional)

3.b. Deploy HS and AA

  1. Ensure you have already obtained the proper .tarball.

  2. The archive will expand into a shib/ directory(/usr/local/ recommended).

  3. Run the following command to move the Java files into Tomcat's tree:

    cp /usr/local/shib/java/shibboleth.war /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/
  4. Restart Tomcat, which will automatically detect that there has been a new .war file added. This file will by default be expanded into /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth.

  5. Apache must be told to map the URL's for the Shibboleth HS and AA to Tomcat. Two popular ways of doing this are to include the following text directly in httpd.conf, or to place Include conf/mod_jk.conf in httpd.conf, and place the following lines in /etc/httpd/conf/mod_jk.conf:

    --------- begin ---------
    <IfModule !mod_jk.c>
     LoadModule jk_module libexec/mod_jk.so
    </IfModule>

    JkWorkersFile "/usr/local/tomcat/conf/jk/workers.properties"
    JkLogFile "/usr/local/apache/logs/mod_jk.log"

    JkLogLevel emerg

    JkMount /shibboleth/* ajp13

    --------- end ---------
  6. Modify Tomcat's /conf/server.xml as follows:

    1. Add address="127.0.0.1" inside the <Ajp12Connector> and <Ajp13Connector> configuration elements to prevent off-host access.

    2. Add tomcatAuthentication="false" to the <Ajp13Connector> configuration element to ensure that the user's identity is passed from Apache to the servlet environment.

3.c. Implement a MySQL directory (optional)

  1. A MySQL database needs to be implemented along with a JDBC driver MM.MySQL such as for use by the HS. The driver selected should be unpacked and the .jar file should be moved to /usr/local/tomcat/lib/apps/.

  2. Using /usr/local/shib/etc/shibdump.sql, a MySQL database must be created. Copy this file where desired. The default access for Shibboleth to the database is shib/shib. This can and should be changed for security purposes in both the database itself and web.xml.

  3. As admin, run mysql < shibdump.sql; this may be done locally or on another machine.




4. Getting Running

4.a. Basic Configuration

The main configuration file for Shibboleth's origin side is located in /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/web.xml. This file contains configuration information for the origin side in several sections. The first is a set of options that must be defined outside the servlet configuration, followed by configuration information for the HS and the AA. The configuration must be consistent with values elsewhere in the deployment, such as the HS' certificate and with directory access usr/pwd, etc., or access errors will occur. These are the variables that may be specified for each component of web.xml:

repository = <type>

This option must be specified outside the servlet description, and specifies the method used to store handles. The two currently valid values are SQL and MEMORY.


MySQL(optional -- These values must be populated outside the servlet description if repository = SQL):

DBdriver = <driver name>

This is the name of the driver that the HS should use in queries to the MySQL database. For MM.MySQL, this should be org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver.

DBuser = <login>

This is the username used to login to the MySQL database, and must be consistent with one defined in the database.

DBpass = <password>

This is the password used to login to the MySQL database, and must be consistent with one defined in the database.

DBdomain = <domain>

Specifies the location of the MySQL server. Localhost cannot be used as a value due to processing by the Tomcat server; even if the database is hosted locally, the FQDN must be used.


HS:

domain = <domain name>

Specifies the domain in which the HS is located, e.g. internet2.edu. Used to populate the Subject NameQualifier in issued attribute assertions.

HSname = <domain name>

Specifies the machine on which the HS is located, e.g. shib.internet2.edu

ticket = <milliseconds>

Specifies the duration in milliseconds for which an issued attribute assertion should be valid; defaults to 1400000. Refer to club guidelines for advice in populating this field.

AAurl = <url>

Defines the URL where the AA runs, such as https://shib.internet2.edu/shibboleth/AA.

KSpath = <pathname>

Defines the pathname to the JKS keystore that is used by the HS. The effective root of this path is /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth and the keystore should usually be placed in WEB-INF/conf(Defaults to /WEB-INF/conf/keystore.jks)

KSpass = <password>

Specifies the password used to access the JKS keystore.

KSkeyalias = <alias>

Specifies the alias used to access the HS's private key entry within the keystore.

KSkeypass = <password>

Specifies the password used to access the HS's private key entry within the keystore.

certalias = <alias>

This is the alias used to access the certificate associated with the key used by the HS within the keystore. Should be identical to KSkeyalias.

username = <HTTP Request Header>

Specifies the CGI header to pull username from when assigning handles. If omitted, REMOTE_USER is assumed.


AA:

domain = <domain name>

Specifies the domain in which the AA is located, e.g. internet2.edu. This is the default scope for attributes.

arpFactoryMethod = <method>

This will eventually allow for the selection of how ARP's are stored, supporting SQL databases and LDAP repositories. Currently, file is the only method supported.

ctxFactoryClass = <parameter>

This optional parameter allows sites to override how AA will populate attribute assertions. This is only needed if LDAP is not used.

An echo setting is provided for testing by specifying the parameter edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.aaLocal.EchoCtxFactory which will automatically return eduPersonAffiliation=member and eduPersonPrincipalName populated with the UID used to login the user in question.



LDAP(optional -- These values must be provided if LDAP is used(e.g. ctxFactoryClass not specified)):

dirUrl = <LDAP URL>

This is the URL of the LDAP directory from which Shibboleth should retrieve user attributes. It should contain the LDAP hostname and search base. An example query URL would be ldap://shib2.internet2.edu/ou=People,dc=internet2,dc=edu

ctxPrincipal = <DN>

This optional parameter allows for specification of the DN to be used if you want the HS to BIND to the LDAP server before issuing the query.

ctxCredentials = <password>

This parameter defines the password used for the LDAP BIND. Must be specified if ctxPrincipal is populated.

ldapUserDnPhrase = <DC>

This is the prefix for the last part of the DN; e.g., uid=. The user's ID is dynamically appended to this value to create the user's complete DN. Note that if username is not part of the LDAP DN, a customized ctxFactoryClass must be built and used for LDAP to work. Additionally, %s may be specified as part of <DC>; if %s is specified, it will be replaced with the user's ID and is used as an LDAP search filter. The query must return exactly one entry.


4.b. Key Generation and Certificate Installation

The SAML messages generated by the HS must be digitally signed. Each HS must be issued a private and public keypair, which is stored in a Java keystore. The current implementation of Shibboleth requires the use of an ordinary file-based keystore. The keytool program is included with the Java development and runtime kits. Access parameters to the keystore will need to be consistent with those specified in web.xml.

A sample keystore that can be used is included in the distribution and can be found in /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/conf/keystore.jks with a password of shibhs.

The following commands will generate a new RSA keypair and store it in the keystore.jks file, with a keyentry alias of hs and new passwords of your choosing:

$ cd /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/shibboleth/WEB-INF/conf
$ keytool -storepasswd -keystore keystore.jks -new <newpassword>
$ keytool -genkey -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -keyalg rsa -keysize 2048

You will be prompted for passwords during key generation as needed, to access the keystore and assign the key itself its own password. You will also be prompted for the distinguished name components to associate with the key. This DN will be placed in a self-signed certificate and will be the name that is associated with your HS by Shibboleth. In particular, the first component you enter for Name will be the Common Name(when keytool asks for first and last name, common name is intended), which in most cases should be the hostname of the HS system. Note that a specific club of sites may dictate what type of key algorithm, key size, or validity period is appropriate. For Club Shib, RSA should be used with a minimum keysize of 2048 bits.

Once you have a keypair generated, the self-signed certificate must be replaced with a certificate signed by a CA acceptable to the club you will be joining. If your certificate is signed by an intermediate CA, such as a campus CA which has been signed by CREN, the trust will fail unless the intermediate CA is recognized as a trusted root by club members as well as the superior CA. This restriction may change in subsequent releases.

To generate a certificate signing request for a CA, use the following command:

$ keytool -certreq -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -file <csr-file>

The contents of <csr-file> can then be sent to a CA for signing. You will receive a signed certificate in return in a file. To install the new certificate into your keystore, use the following command:

$ keytool -import -keystore keystore.jks -alias hs -file <cert-file>

Note that if the signing CA's certificate is not already installed in your keystore as a trusted signer, you may need to download the CA's root certificate and import it into the keystore file under a different alias, using a command similar to the above.

4.b.i. Sharing certificate/key pairs between Apache and Java keystores (optional)

The JDK includes the command line program keytool for managing Java keystores. This utility cannot import or export private key information, making it difficult to use the same private key and certificate for Apache and Java-based applications. The Shibboleth distribution includes extkeytool, a program that can be used in conjunction with keytool to perform these tasks. Select the appropriate step-by-step procedure for your situation from the following guides.

If you have a pre-exiting RSA key/certificate combination in a keystore and you would like to use it with Apache:

  1. Determine the alias of the keystore keyEntry containing the key you would like to use in your Apache setup. Assuming that your keystore is named yourstore, the following command should present a list of the entries in the keystore.

    $ keytool -list -v -keystore yourstore

  2. Assuming that you identified the appropriate alias as youralias and the password for the keystore is yourpass, enter the following command to export the key in Base64-encoded pkcs8 format.

    $ extkeytool -exportkey -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -storepass yourpass -rfc -file yourkey.pkcs8

  3. In order to use this key with Apache, you must convert it to PEM-encoded RSA native format. You have the option of storing the key unencrypted or encrypted:

    1. To use the unencrypted format, enter the following command for the conversion:

      $ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.pkcs8 -nocrypt|openssl rsa -out yourkey.key

    2. To use the encrypted format, enter the following command for the conversion:

      $ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.pkcs8 -nocrypt|openssl rsa -des3 -out yourkey.enckey

  4. The following command will export the corresponding certificate.

    $ keytool -export -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -rfc -file yourcert

  5. Set the mod_ssl SSLCertificateKeyFile and SSLCertificateFile directives to point to the two files you have just created. Take care to remove any temporary files you created (i.e. yourkey.pkcs8) and set appropriate file permissions, especially if you chose to store the key in an unencrypted format.

If you have a pre-existing RSA key/certificate combination that you use with Apache and would like to import it into a java keystore:

  1. Convert the private key to unencrypted DER-encoded pkcs8 format. Assuming your PEM-encoded key is stored in a file named yourkey.enckey, enter the following command.

    $ openssl pkcs8 -in yourkey.enckey -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER -out yourkey.der.pkcs8

  2. Create a certificate bundle file. This file should include a series of PEM-encoded X509 certificates representing a complete trust chain, from the root CA certificate to the certificate that matches your private key. If your certificate is stored in a file named mycert and the CA signer certificate is stored in a file named ca.cert, you might enter the following command to create the bundle.

    $ cat mycert ca.cert > cert.bundle

    Note: mod_ssl-enabled Apache installations include a number of commonly recognized CA certificates in the ca-bundle.crt file under the $ServerRoot/conf/ssl.crt/ directory.
  3. Import the key and certificate into the keystore. Assuming you have already created a keystore named yourstore with a password of of yourpass, enter the following command to store the data under the alias youralias.

    $ ./extkeytool -importkey -keystore yourstore -alias youralias -storepass yourpass -keyfile yourkey.der.pkcs8 -certfile cert.bundle -provider org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider

  4. You can verify that the import was successful by listing entry. Use the command below.

    $ keytool -list -v -keystore yourstore -alias youralias

  5. Remember to delete yourkey.der.pkcs8, as it contains your unencrypted private key.

If you are starting from scratch and do not yet have a certificate/key pair:

  1. Generate an RSA private key. Use the command below, substituting yourkey with an appropriate name to use to refer to the key.

    $ openssl genrsa -des3 -out yourkey.enckey 1024

  2. The following command generates a Certificate Signing Request, which should be communicated to a Certificate Authority.

    $ openssl req -new -key yourkey.enckey

  3. The Certificate Authority should respond with a PEM-encoded X509 certificate. Set the mod_ssl SSLCertificateKeyFile directive to point to the key file you just created and the SSLCertificateFile directive to point to file containing the certificate issued by the Certificate Authority. Previous sections explaion how to share the key/certificate pair with a Java keystore.

4.c. Linking the Authentication System to the HS

The interaction between the HS and the local authentication system is implemented by supplying the HS with the identity of the browser user. Most often, this will mean protecting the HS servlet with some form of local authentication that populates REMOTE_USER, or another header specified to the HS via web.xml. Location blocks can be added to httpd.conf, associating the appropriate authentication mechanism with the URL of the HS servlet. The following example demonstrates association of a very basic authentication method with the HS:

<Location /shibboleth/HS>
AuthType Basic
AuthName "Internet2 Handle Service"
AuthUserFile /usr/local/apache/conf/user.db
require valid-user
</Location>

Note that .htaccess files cannot be used for this purpose because URL's are "virtualized" by Tomcat.

It is recommended that the origin be tested at the end of this process using the process described in section 6.a.

4.d. Deploying AA plug-ins for attributes(Java API)

Under development and extremely likely to fluctuate with future implementation.

4.e. Establishing default ARP's for the origin community

An ARP determines which attributes are released to a SHAR when a user tries to access a resource. Because of the architecture of the Shibboleth protocols, the requesting SHAR is the component that must be considered first when evaluating which ARP to use. After the requesting SHAR has been identified, the URL trees defined for that SHAR are considered, from which the best match is selected and the specified attributes are released. The data sources for the AA are authoritative and information they do not contain cannot be created by use of ARP's in any way.

ARP's can be defined either on a site-wide basis or for individual users. Although an arbitrary number of ARP's may be defined for an arbitrary number of SHAR's and URL trees within SHAR's, only the most precisely matching ARP is used determine the release of information to a target site. Domain names are processed first in reverse component order, followed by the processing of the rest of the URL in normal order. * is a valid wildcard and all ARP's are assumed to terminate in a *. Filters can also be constructed to screen attributes before release to pull out site-specific information, or release only specific parts of given attributes.

Site ARP's are defined differently, and only one set of site ARP's can be defined for a given AA. Several special types of ARP may be defined in the site policy. One default ARP for any SHAR or URL that is not matched may be formed. The release of certain attributes to certain targets may be marked exclude, which disallows the release of that attribute, even if the user tries to specify it for themself. Similarly, certain attributes to certain targets may be marked include, which disallows the user from denying the release of that attribute. Filters are evaluated for both includes and excludes, which screen the released attributes. A filtered include for a value that a user does not have will not force the release of that value. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include.

A set of default ARP's should be established for the community. When Shibboleth is installed, there are no defined ARP's, and therefore, nothing will ever be released. This must be modified using either the text-based editor or the MyAA webapp. Since these settings will govern the privacy of your users, site ARP's should be defined carefully before any sensitive information is utilized, and users should be informed of their reponsibility to regulate the release of sensitive information.

Management of ARP's may be delegated to other users to allow for distributed editing. Each component of each ARP -- SHAR, URL, and attribute -- may be given an ACL. Users listed in the ACL will be granted the ability to modify that particular ARP object and create additional ARP objects further down the ARP tree: the manager of a SHAR ARP could add new URL trees, but the manager of a URL tree could not add new URL trees within the SHAR. Control of an ARP object grants the ability to modify any component on the ARP tree beneath that object.

For more precise information regarding how ARP's are processed or syntactically formed, please refer to section 5.a.i.

4.f. MyAA

MyAA is a web-based tool for the management of ARP's. It is intended primarily for users who want to expand the default ARP's to handle special needs and applications, or impose stricter privacy parameters. MyAA's web interface should be configured and placed as appropriate for your institution. Users should be made aware of how to best use the tool for their requirements. Please refer to section 5.a.iv for technical information.





5. Advanced Configuration

5.a. ARP Syntax

This section applies primarily to the syntactic and technical details of ARP's. For basic information on and explanation of the construction of ARP's, processing logic, and ARP management, please refer to section 4.e.

ARP's are stored in the form of several objects: ARP, ARP:SHAR, ARP:RESOURCE, and ARP:ATTR. Each of these objects has an associated ACL which defines the set of users who can define and modify that object and its subordinate objects; for example, if user parviz is in the ACL of an ARP:SHAR of shar.osu.edu, then parviz has the permission to create a new ARP:RESOURCE object hanging from the shar.osu.edu ARP:SHAR object. This allows for delegated management of ARP's.

5.a.i. Site ARP

The site ARP must be formed for the ARP user admin; ARP's for other users are applicable only to attribute release requests based on that user. If both a site ARP and a user ARP are applicable to a particular SHAR/URL combination, then the attributes released are the union of the two ARP's necessarily excluding any attributes marked exclude and necessarily including any attributes marked include. ARP's may be managed both using the ArpUtil tool, and the MyAA web interface.

Following is an example of a site ARP. The SHAR no.other.match is defined as the default SHAR, must have a URL tree of *, and there must be only one present in any valid site ARP; defaults must not be used in user ARP's. This SHAR is used if no match is found for a requesting SHAR in the union of the site ARP and the applicable user ARP. It is recommended that an extremely minimal set of information be released to the no.other.match SHAR. Note that the site ARP is never evaluated alone, and must always be interpreted in the context of a particular user. If there is no SHAR/URL combination specified by the user or site ARP that matches those in the request, the default is always used.

ARP: admin
       SHAR: no.other.match (default)
               URL: *
                       ATTR: eduPersonAffiliation
       SHAR: shar.osu.edu
               URL: http://www.osu.edu/research
                       ATTR: eduPersonPrimaryName (include)
                       ATTR: eduPersonAffiliation filter: employee
       SHAR: shar.mit.edu
               URL: http://*.mit.edu
                       ATTR: eduPersonPrimaryName (exclude)

eduPersonAffiliation will be released to any SHAR that is not defined in either the admin or applicable user ARP.

Requests from shar.osu.edu for the http://www.osu.edu/research tree will receive the valid eduPersonPrimaryName for any user; users cannot deny the release of this attribute or any values of this attribute in their own ARP's.

Employee will always be filtered from release for all users to shar.osu.edu at http://www.osu.edu/research, regardless of the user ARP; however, if and only if that user has some other value of eduPersonAffiliation defined in the directory, then that other value will still be released.

Requests from shar.mit.edu for any URL of the form http://*.mit.edu/* will never be released eduPersonPrimaryName. Users cannot release this attribute to this SHAR/URL combination.

5.a.ii. User ARP's

User ARP's can only block or permit the release of specific attributes. For example, if a site maintains attributes A, B, and C, then the user must first define an ARP for attribute A. Then, the user proceeds to create a filter, to block the release of certain values of that attribute. However, a user cannot define an ARP such that all attributes but A should be released. Additionally, ARP's that are set as exclude by a site ARP cannot be modified by the user. The full details of the ARP's that are applicable to a principle can be discovered using the ArpUtil tool, although MyAA is more appropriate for individual users and should provide adequate functionality. Users may also see notes associated with ARP's, which may be used for functions such as "We have forced this release to allow your collaboration in Physics 202 with Brown University." Additionally, users may create notes to themselves here when specifying user ARP's.

The following example of the ARP's that would apply to the user parviz, as obtained using ./ArpUtil list parviz -acls. Only the user ARP is visible, although all applicable site ARP's will be evaluated for a request as well.

ARP: parviz
ACL: arpAcl{[+blk([INSERT]), +dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
       SHAR: shar.cmu.edu
       ACL: sharAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
               URL: http://www.cmu.edu [edu, cmu, www]
               ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
                       EPPN
                       AFFILS filter: staff, faculty,
               URL: http://www.cs.cmu.edu [edu, cmu, cs, www]
               ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
                       EPPN
       SHAR: shar.mit.edu
       ACL: sharAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
               URL: http://*.mit.edu [edu, mit, *]
               ACL: resourceAcl{[+dousti([ALL])]}{[]}
                        AFFILS
       SHAR: shar.osu.edu
       ACL:sharAcl{[+blk([ALL])]}{[]}
               URL: *.edu [edu, *]
               ACL: resourceAcl{[+blk([ALL])]}{[]}
                       AFFILS filter: staff, faculty, employee,

dousti has the permission to modify any entry except for the last SHAR and all information beneath it, which may be maintained only by blk.

The release of EPPN and eduPersonAffiliation is allowed to anything within the SHAR shar.cmu.edu and the URL tree http://www.cmu.edu/*, and eduPersonAffiliation values of only staff or faculty such that if eduPersonAffiliation contains student, faculty, employee, then only faculty will be released; if it is staff, faculty, then the value released will be staff, faculty; if it is employee, then the value will be null.

EPPN alone will be released to the URL tree http://www.cs.cmu.edu if and only if the querying SHAR is shar.cmu.edu.

Any URL of the form http://*.mit.edu behind the SHAR shar.mit.edu will be released the full eduPersonAffiliation of the principle and nothing more.

Any URL of the form *.edu behind the SHAR shar.osu.edu will only be released values of eduPersonAffiliation that are staff, faculty, or employee.

5.a.iii. ArpUtil

The ArpUtil tool is more powerful than the web interface and provides functionality the web interface does not. ArpUtil is part of the distribution and will by default be in /usr/local/shib/beta/.

These are the commands ArpUtil supports.

ArpUtil list <arp name> [-acls]

This command will list all the ARP logic pertaining to the arp name principle.

ArpUtil add <arp name> [-admin] <shar name> [-default] <url> <attribute name> [-exclude] [-filter [!]<val1> [!]<val2> ...]

This command will create a new ARP for a given SHAR, URL tree, and attribute name, or add to an existing ARP if specified.

ArpUtil remove <arp name> [<shar name> [<url> [<attribute name>]]]

This command will remove a given ARP, or parts of an ARP instead if specified.

ArpUtil setAcl <user> <acl> <arp name> [<shar name> [<url>]]

This command will alter the ACL for a given ARP object.


These are the options associated with the various ArpUtil commands in alphabetical order.

acl

This specifies the ACL to be applied. ACL's currently take the form of username.

-acls

Provides a more detailed ARP list, including ACL information for each object.

-admin

Used to modify the site ARP. Site ARP's are applicable to all principles referenced by an AA.

arp name

Provides the a name for the ARP. This can be arbitrarily specified, but will be used in future modifications to the ARP.

attribute name

The attribute name for which the ARP is valid. This must match the representation of the attribute within the AA logic.

-default

This option negates the SHAR name and makes the ARP valid for all SHAR's. Valid only for -admin.

-exclude

This option specifies that this ARP must be followed and cannot be superceded. Valid only for -admin.

-filter

This defines the filter that will be applied to the attribute value when evaluating an ARP. An attribute value will be permitted for release if it is val1, etc., but if the ! modifier is specified, then the filtered value will not be released even if it is part of the attribute value. See the above examples for use cases.

shar name

Provides the SHAR with which the ARP should be associated, e.g. shar.mit.edu.

url

The URL tree for which the ARP is valid. All *'s are treated as valid wildcards, and entered URL's are assumed to terminate with *. Otherwise, the URL must be properly formed.

user

This specifies which user's ARP objects will be modified.

5.a.iv. MyAA

This section applies primarily to the technical details of MyAA. For basic information on MyAA, please refer to section 4.f.

MyAA is intended to allow for a simple, web-based interface for users to modify their own ARP's. There is functionality ArpUtil supports that MyAA does not; for example, SHAR's are masked. Users currently login simply by entering their name, and the following page will allow modification of ARP's for the logged-in user. The following options are available from the webpage once the user is logged in:

Add New Resource

This will pull up a new page which will allow a user to specify a new ARP:RESOURCE within an existing ARP:SHAR. Resource URL is the URL tree for which the ARP is valid. All *'s are treated as valid wildcards, and entered URL's are assumed to terminate with *. The attributes that may be released and the values that this attribute may contain are displayed, and a checkbox is provided. If the box is checked, the attribute will be released; if not, it will be explicitly prohibited from release.

This cannot override existing ARP's that are set exclude or include.

Delete Entire ARP

This will delete all ARP's associated with a user that the user is permitted to delete based on ARP ACL's.

Delete Resource

This will delete an ARP that applies to the user if the user is permitted to delete this ARP based on the ARP's ACL.

Edit Resource

This will allow the resource to be edited using the same interface as is used to create new resources.




6. Troubleshooting

This section provides basic information about testing, logging, and error handling for Shibboleth origins. This information is not intended to be comprehensive, but instead rudimentary guidelines for basic configuration tests and problems. For more detailed information or answers to specific problems not addressed in this section, please mail with a thorough description of errors and configurations used.

6.a. Basic Testing

Internet2 provides a basic target that can be used to test origin setup functionality. After your origin is recognized by Club Shib, simply use any browser to access https://wayf.internet2.edu/shibboleth/sample.jsp. Select your origin's name and follow the login process as a user would. Note that SSL must be used, and both the HS and AA must be fully configured.

The test target will then display a simple page which includes the basic information sent to it by your origin and the authentication rules it is using.

For information regarding specific error messages that may be generated if the origin does not work successfully, please refer to section 6.c.

6.b. Logging

Shibboleth's origin components log various operations which may prove useful for auditing, testing, and security purposes. This data is sent through log4j's standard mechanism with a log level of INFO. The location of the log file, the level at which the log is output, the formatting of the logs, and many more options may be configured by editing /WEB-INF/conf/log4j.properties. By default, it is setup to log to the console of the servlet container, with a level of WARN, but there is also a commented out example in the file to give a possible alternate configuration.

6.c. Common Problems

Shibboleth origins have not yet been sufficiently widely deployed in diverse environments to identify problems commonly encountered. At this point, please mail with any questions or problems encountered for answers to specific issues. As a knowledge base grows, this section will be developed.




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