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Re: Encryption key strategies


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  • From: "Tom Scavo" <>
  • To:
  • Subject: Re: Encryption key strategies
  • Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 08:34:12 -0400
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On 6/22/06, Scott Cantor
<>
wrote:

I asked around a little and determined that in SAML (or Liberty) land,
nobody's pushing much beyond per-message keys.

Is it reasonable to extend this beyond a single message and think
about per-transaction keys? The responder, for example, might reuse a
symmetric key in the request to encrypt a portion of the response.
For example, the responder might reuse a key that was used to encrypt
the NameID in the request to encrypt an assertion in the response.

Tom

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