shibboleth-dev - Re: authentication authority
Subject: Shibboleth Developers
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- From: Tom Scavo <>
- To:
- Subject: Re: authentication authority
- Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2005 14:17:51 -0400
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On 10/14/05, Brent Putman
<>
wrote:
>
> I think what Scott proposed, and what you are looking for, is very
> similar to what Chad presented at GridWorld/GGF last week. In a
> nutshell it involves using SAML 2.0 AuthnRequest and
> RequestedAuthnContext. See Chad's slides available here:
>
> http://www.ggf.org/GGF15/ggf_events_schedule_UserManagement.htm
Brent, thanks for the pointer. I was at Chad's excellent presentation
last week.
> We will probably be implementing something very similar for another
> non-Grid fat client-server oriented project (Sentinel) - yes, by
> non-spec-compliant backporting it to Shib 1.3 (that is, not compliant to
> SAML 1.1), and implementing an IdP handler which can process the
> AuthnRequest for various cred types (username/password, client cert,
> biometrics, etc) and issue an authentication assertion.
Cool.
> I actually think his proposal is very relevant to this entire thread.
Chad's proposal is based on WS-*, and as you probably know,
transport-level security is still the default in GT4. Message-level
security, although it's included in GT4, will remain mostly a research
topic until the standards have solidified and the performance issues
have been addressed.
One of our requirements is that GridShib MUST work with pre-WS GT4
deployments (which is most of them), which means we don't have the
luxury of SAML 2.0 and WS-*, at least for this first iteration of the
technology. So our use case is considerably more constrained than
yours.
Tom
- Re: authentication authority, (continued)
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/08/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/08/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/10/2005
- RE: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/10/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/12/2005
- RE: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/13/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/13/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/13/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Brent Putman, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Brent Putman, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Barton, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
- RE: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Scott Cantor, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/08/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Brent Putman, 10/14/2005
- Re: authentication authority, Tom Scavo, 10/14/2005
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