Internet2 Network Security SIG

["Schopis, Paul" <>]

I think the 10+ is adequate for the now but will grow quickly. As a practical matter I am not aware of any service that offers 100G capacity currently, but that is quick changing environment. The threat vector would intuitively, at least, be restricted to capacity (i.e. if I have 20G from vendor X it would not be more than that) but I suppose in widely distributed attacks we wouldn’t really know how much is falling on the floor before we see it.

 

From: [mailto:] On Behalf Of Frank Seesink
Sent: Tuesday, September 08, 2015 11:53 AM
To: David Farmer
Cc: Steven Wallace;
Subject: Re: [Security-WG] seeking input for providing DDoS vendors background for the webinars

 

While I understand Dave’s view, our reality is a bit different.  Truth is what constitutes a “trivial” vs. “normal” (odd word choice) vs. “severe” vs. “extreme” attack level is relative.  One size does not fit all.  Maybe in Minnesota 3-30G is “normal”, but here in WV DDoS attacks >10G can start impacting services.  I would call that anything BUT “normal”.  But our regional network doesn’t have the capacity some of our compatriots have.  I envy our neighbors with their 100G+ backbones, but I have to be the voice for those of us coming from smaller institutions/networks.

 

Maybe a wording to reflect that variability would be in order.  I understand a 10G mitigation service might not be of interest to the larger schools/networks, but we also don’t want to make it such that we only have vendors who bring higher cost/large scale solutions.

 

 

On Sep 8, 2015, at 11:37 AM, David Farmer <> wrote:

 

While technically accurate, saying grater that 10G doesn't sufficiently describe what we need.

 

I think grater than 100G might be better if you want to keep it simple.  Otherwise, I'm thinking a out quantify attack levels as follows; 3G or less is trivial, 3-30G is a normal, 30-300G severe, 300G+ extreme (world class).

 

Recent attacks on our community were estimated in the 90G range this is the planing minimum I'm thinking about.  I'm not expecting to handle that without impact but I'm expecting to be able to deal with it. 

 

Hope that helps.

-- 

===============================================

David Farmer                          Email:

Office of Information Technology

University of Minnesota    

2218 University Ave SE         Phone: +1-612-626-0815

Minneapolis, MN 55414-3029   Cell: +1-612-812-9952

===============================================

 

On Sep 1, 2015, at 10:34, Steven Wallace <> wrote:

Paul suggested that the vendor presentations would be more focused if we shared our requirements. Below is what I think is generally representative of our interests/requirements. IU is currently in discussions with Incapsulate, so it should be easy for me to reach out to them for the first webinar. These will be recorded, so less critical for everyone to attend, however if there are specific areas of interested, or questions, let me know so that can be addressed.

 

Please provide any input for the following, as it will convey to the vendor the topics we wish them to address.

 

thanks,

 

steven

 

 

Describe how your service addresses the following attacks against a university or regional network (will offer pointers to descriptions of each):

 

• DDoS attacks that result in a high volume of inbound traffic (greater than 10Gb/s) and disrupt both the targeted services as well as the operation of the network itself.
• persistent DDoS attacks against key services or infrastructure (DNS, key web server, VPN, etc.)

 

Solutions we’re interested in, but will welcome a more expansive response:

 

• capability to host a services remotely always and/or during an attack
• capability to detect and alert of an attack
• capability to scrub traffic
• capability to work with major ISPs to coordinate mitigation 
• DNS services
• layer 7-aware firewall/scrubbing 

 

Please include details such as:

 

• mechanisms supported for announcing prefixes for a scrubbing service (e.g., BGP signaling)
• attack/service dashboard
• on-boarding process
• capacity
• how are SSL sessions proxied (who supplies keys, etc.)

 

 

 

 

 

Frank Seesink
Telecommunications Network Specialist III
West Virginia Network (WVNET)
304.293.5192 x241